The sovereign nature of the forms of operation of cultural heritage protection authorities, the polarization between the individual interest and the public interest, discretion margin in the activities of the authorities -all these elements create a kind of "explosive mixture", which is the source of the legal disputes between the owners of historical monuments and historical monuments protection bodies.
INTRODUCTION
Protection of historical monuments is an area of particular polarization of public and individual interests. There is a state of tension between the freedom to use the subject of property rights and the public interest expressed in the need to protect one of the key elements of the cultural heritage of the state. Almost every form of monument protection is a limitation of property right. Protection of historical monuments is an expression of the care for the memory and cultural identity of the nation, and this is an element of the raison d'être. The legal forms of the implementation of tasks by the historical monument protection authorities must be sufficiently flexible. The object of protection is of a specific character. To determine what a monument is and, consequently, what the subject of protection is, requires an assessment based on expertise in the field of art, history and science. It is difficult to describe the subject of the protection in an abstract way, using the rigid language of legal norms. This creates the first sphere of discretion margin in the activity of historical monuments protection bodies.
In addition, the administrative body's activities must be adequate to the needs of a particular object of protection, so the body must creatively and dynamically adjust the activities to the needs. This creates the second sphere of discretion margin. The legislature is not able to describe in a rigid way the determinants for taking appropriate protective measures by the authorities.
The sovereign nature of a significant part of the forms of operation of cultural heritage protection authorities, the polarization between the individual interest and the public interest, the necessary discretion margin in the activities of the authorities -all these elements create a kind of "explosive mixture" that creates legal disputes between the owners of historical monuments and historical monuments protection bodies.
The key element of the guarantee of individual freedom is the judicial review of public administration. Therefore, it is a matter of dispute to which extent the public administration is subject to judicial review. It is about appropriate separation of functions: the public administration is to implement the administrative policy, while the role of administrative courts is to review whether this function is correctly exercised under the legal provisions governing the activity of the administration.
Due to the separation of functions, the court cannot substitute the administrative body, and it cannot take a discretionary ruling instead of the ruling the body has
DISCRETION MARGIN IN THE ACTIVITIES OF HISTORICAL MONUMENTS PROTECTION BODIES

DISCRETION MARGIN IN THE ACTIVITIES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
The approach to classifying the types of discretion margin in the activities of public administration bodies differs in different legal systems.
The Polish studies of administrative law remain under the influence of the German-language legal scholarly opinion, maintaining the division into two different areas of discretion margin: administrative discretion and other types of freedom of assessment resulting from the use of vague terms.
For German-language science, it is characteristic to separate the spheres of the discretionary powers in the activities of public administration through the distinction between discretion (Ermessen) and the vague terms (unbestimmte Begriffe). The notion of discretion should refer only to the element of a legal norm specifying the legal consequences. Discretion occurs when the statutory conditions of the actual state are related to an alternative, equivalent from the point of view of the lawfulness of the settlement. 2 In the sphere related to the determination of the facts, a form of discretion margin is the concept of free evaluation areas (Beurteilungsspielräume). 3 The legislature introduces this form of discretion margin in administration activities through the use of vague terms. However, these forms do not constitute a uniform category.
It is distinguished, on the one hand, by the "empirical" notions which can be clarified on the basis of objectively verifiable indicators. Their vagueness is conditioned by the factual circumstances regarding time or place, which means that 1 Hartmut Maurer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (München: C.H. Beck 2011), 142. 2 Ibid., 143-144; Norbert Achterberg, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller 1986), 345-346. 3 Otto Bachof, "Beurteilungsspielraum, Ermessen und unbestimmter Rechtsbegriff," Juristenzeitung No. 4 (1955) : 97-98. ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019 91 the meaning of this term in a specific place and at a specific time can be objectively clearly specified (defined). Such a degree of objectivity cannot be achieved in relation to vague terms in the strict sense. In the case of these terms, all that falls under the type is legal, and everything that goes beyond this area is illegal. 4 It is impossible to state, by cognitive reasoning, what the correct meaning of the vague term in an individual case is. The legally permitted content is on a certain scale of assessments.
In contemporary Polish case law and studies of administrative law the view prevails that there are two different areas of discretion margin: administrative discretion and other types of freedom of assessment resulting from the use of vague terms. Administrative discretion refers to the choice of the conclusion, while the freedom of assessment relates to the interpretation of legal provisions and the assessment of facts, the factual basis of the conclusion. 5 Polish studies of administrative law propose various definitions of administrative discretion. As an example which indicates the key elements of this concept, one can indicate an opinion that definite administrative discretion as the legal authorization of public administration bodies to a specific action, consisting in granting the administrative authorities the option of choosing from two or more permissible by law, and legally equivalent solutions. 6 Similarly, the case-law stresses on the one hand that administrative discretion means the authorization of the administrative body to choose a solution. 7 On the other hand, the case law points out differences in the nature of decision-making gaps: when using vague terms, the body does not act within the framework of administrative discretion, but fills these vague terms with appropriate content, on the basis of established facts. Administrative discretion is an acceptable legal possibility of an alternative resolution of the case. It is not the 4 same as filling the vague terms with specific contents by establishing the facts and deriving conclusions from these findings. 8
THE SPECIFICITY OF DISCRETION MARGIN IN THE MONUMENT
PROTECTION
Legal regulations in different legal systems defining the tasks of monument protection authorities create a specific accumulation of discretion margin. First of all, there are different species of discretion margin at different levels of regulation:
both at the level of the description of the facts (vague terms), and on the other, there is also a typical discretion in the regulations, and thus an element of the description of legal consequences. Secondly, at the level of the description of facts, there is another aspect of the specificity of discretion margin, resulting from a peculiar mix of technical, historical and art-related knowledge, but also assessments of the value. The specificity of discretion margin appears at the basics -the normative definition of the object of protection. Various terminology is used in different legal systems, indicating a broader (cultural heritage) or narrower (historical monument) scope of the concept. The terminology used by the legislature can be dictated by various motives. Of course, the scope of regulation is a general motive -whether it is generally about all the cultural assets (broadly understood), irrespective of the era they come from, or the regulation is to deal with a slightly narrower aspect: "memorabilia of the past" deserving protection as a testimony of the development of cultural heritage in various geographical aspects (global, regional, national).
The Polish Act of 23 July 2003, on protection and guardianship of historical monuments uses a narrow concept of a historical monument. 9 The act defines a historical monument as: immovable or movable object or part or group thereof, made by man or connected with man's activity and constituting a testimony to a past era or event, the preservation of which is in the interest of society due to its historical, artistic, scientific or academic value (Article 3.1).
The statutory definition of a historical monument contains a number of vague terms, ranging from determining whether an object "a testimony to a past era or event", by assessing its "historical, artistic or academic value", to determining whether the preservation of this object is in the "interest of society". The discretion margin of the body has a different character in each of these elements. The evaluation of historical, artistic or academic value of a historical monument 8 undoubtedly refers to empirical knowledge. However, it is also a reasoning leaded in the sphere of values, that is, assessments, and these can never be fully objectified.
The most susceptible element to the possibility of an objective approach seems to be the concept of "testimony to a past era or event". On closer examination, such a statement becomes doubtful. There are questions: what is this past era, what are its chronological limits? What criteria should be adopted when setting these limits? 10 The colloquial way of perceiving a historical monument seems to point to a distant time frame, but after all, a past era can be defined by the period of the previous socio-political and economic system. If the aim of protection of historical monuments is to protect the evidence of the state's cultural heritage in various stages, it is difficult to overlook the shorter temporal perspective, in this way we can deprive future generations of material testimonies of the past. Although this is a near past for us, for future generations the prospect of looking at the historical character of this type of objects will be completely different. Nevertheless, the adoption of a shorter temporal perspective pushes us to the boggy ground of assessments that are no longer legal but political.
This shows the analysis of the last of the conditions from the definition of the monument: to recognize an object as a historical monument, it is necessary to investigate whether its preservation "is in the interest of the society". This is perhaps the most problematic of the conditions that makes up the definition of a historical monument. First of all, the notion of social interest is the so-called general reference clause. The essence of a general reference clause is the authorization for the body to determine the basis for qualifying the activity of the addressee of the norm based on criteria that are expressed in the legal text, but their content has not been incorporated into the legal system, is outside this system. 11 To determine what elements, what factors in the conditions of a case express the public interest, requires making evaluative, axiological assessments.
However, the public interest must be based on law, so the public interest refers to assessments in the sphere of the axiology of the legal system. The desired state can be considered to be in the public interest only if it passes through the "filter" of the axiology of the legal system. 12 10 If we take into account previous considerations regarding the concept of "testimony of a past era", then legal assessments may become entangled with political assessments. If in the perspective of the values on which the new system is based, the previous system is assessed extremely negatively, it is deemed necessary to remove the material remnants of this system from the public space.
Thus a conflict of values arises at the level of legal policy: should we protect the evidence of the previous system existing in the public space, because regardless of the negative assessments of this system, they are evidence of a bygone era and, therefore, cultural changes in the country? Or maybe we need to remove these objects as symbols of values that are contrary to those on which the current social and political system is based? Such discussions are characteristic for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, due to the political changes that occurred at the turn of the 80s and 90s of the last century.
The assessment of whether the preservation of the object is in the greater social interest must take into account a huge range of factors. On the one hand, the care for the memory of the cultural identity of the nation requires preserving as much evidence of the past as possible. On the other hand, protection means restrictions on the right to property and, hence, social costs. Contrary to appearances, in many situations the financial criterion becomes important: the problem of financing the protection. In the face of limited public resources, we often face an answer to the question of whether it can afford a very wide range of protection of historical relics.
The numerous discretion margin clauses presented in the definition of historical monument induce many authors to criticize the definition adopted by the Polish legislature. The authors formulate postulates of greater precision in the definition of historical monument and the departure from the use of vague terms. 13 In my opinion, this is an expression of misunderstanding of the application of law in such a specific field as the protection of historical monuments. It is just because of the need to seek a compromise between the interests of the owner and the public interest whose decisive role is necessary. A legal regulation that is too rigid makes it impossible to find the right solution.
Granting of discretion margin to the public administration bodies is also an expression of a certain degree of trust of the legislature. Sometimes the legislator 13 Wojciech Kowalski, Katarzyna Zalasińska, "Strategia regulacji prawa ochrony dziedzictwa kulturowego": 75; in: Kamil Zeidler, ed., Prawo ochrony zabytków (Warszawa-Gdańsk: Wolters Kluwer, 2014).; Kararzyna Płażyńska, supra note 10: 105; Maciej Trzciński, "Definicja zabytku archeologicznego -problemy i kontrowersje wokół stosowania prawa": 115-122; in: Kamil Zeidler, ed., Prawo ochrony zabytków (Warszawa-Gdańsk: Wolters Kluwer, 2014). ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019 95 does not want to regulate a specific issue in a strict way, because it wants to leave some freedom to the body. 14 Of course, there is another side of this coin -to be trusted, a law enforcement body must be a specialist. In this context, the following question remains: do officials employed in the historical monument protection administration have adequate expertise in history, art and technology? Are they capable of performing their tasks in terms of these competences, or are they also using third-party expertise due to deficiencies in this area? The specificity of vague terms contained in the legal definition of historical monument results in that their interpretation and application in a specific case require scientific knowledge. As I will show in the next part of the discussion, the Polish administrative courts show more confidence in the specialist knowledge of officials employed in the monument protection bodies.
The statutory elements of the definition of the subject of protection determine the first "circle" of discretion margin of monument conservation bodies. The legislator creates the next circle of discretion margin by defining the premises for applying specific forms of interference. To describe these premises, the legislator often uses vague terms, and in some cases introduces an even wider discretion margin in the form of administrative discretion. Duplication of both areas of discretion margin significantly increases the level of vagueness in the limits of interference.
Examples of this are institutions of temporary seizure of the movable or immovable monuments. These are more moderate forms of interference than the more radical expropriation of the monument. According to article 50.1 of the APHM, in the event of a threat to a movable monument entered into the register in the form of its potential destruction, damage, theft, loss or illegal export abroad, the voivodeship inspector of monuments may issue a decision on securing this monument in the form of a temporary seizure until the threat has been removed.
Whereas in the light of Article 50.3 of the Act, in the event of a threat to an immovable monument entered into the register in the form of its potential destruction or damage, the head of the district, upon a request of the voivodeship inspector of monuments, may issue a decision on securing this monument in the form of a temporary seizure until the threat has been removed.
The notion of threat to a historical monument belongs undoubtedly to the above-mentioned empirical vague terms. In their case, there is the possibility of objective concretization and refinement. The authority using this form of restriction must provide specific arguments referring to the factual situation, when indicating the threat. This argumentation is in principle subject to full control of the 14 Leszek Leszczyński, supra note 11, 232-233. the discretion is of a targeted nature. Nevertheless, the reasons that limit the freedom of the authorities are in the form of indefinite terms, which is the source of a different kind of discretion margin and weakens the legal limits on the use of discretionary powers. In the first example: the status of a monument of history can be given to a monument or park of special value for culture. In turn, a cultural park is established in order to protect a cultural landscape and preserve areas of outstanding landscape with immovable monuments characteristic of local construction and settlement tradition. The body introducing this form of monument protection must assess, among other things, whether we are dealing with elements characteristic of the local building and settlement tradition. This is empirical knowledge that can be controlled based on some criteria. However, the question arises whether the administrative court, unable to appoint experts independent of the authority, is able to verify the correctness of such classification.
Generally speaking, in the case of discretionary forms of action, the decisionmaking power of the body is partially limited by legally determined premises, however, sometimes these premises are formulated using indefinite terms, which opens up another sphere of discretion margin and weakens the restriction of administrative discretion.
Sometimes the legislature tries to clarify the conditions by referring to objectively measurable assessment criteria. An example is the entry of a movable monument into the List of Heritage Treasures (the entry is made by the minister competent for culture and protection of national heritage, Article 14a of the APHM).
In this case, the legislator uses premises of a different nature of discretion margin.
On the one hand, we have a vague term: it is to be a "monument of special value to cultural heritage". This is a typically vague term of an evaluative character, its interpretation is not subject to fully objective measures, and the evaluations will be on a certain scale. On the other hand, the monument must be included in the category specified in the Act, described with the use of measurable criteria: age (over 50, 75, 100 or 200 years, depending on the monument and category) and value (EUR 15,000, 30,000, 50,000, depending on the monument and category. 
ADMINISTRATION IN THE POLISH LEGAL SYSTEM
There are some factors determining the court's approach to controlling the use of discretionary powers by the administration. They relate to the systemic functions of public authorities, the criteria for judicial review and the institutional capacity of courts to exercise administrative control. Constitutionally shaped roles of public authorities, resulting from the division of power, results in that the primary responsibility for shaping and implementation of social and economic policy rests with the legislature and executive. The role of the courts is to stop any excess from the limits of the powers. On the other hand, the court must respect the will of the legislature, which can broadly define the scope of the discretion margin of the public administration, bearing in mind the reasons of expediency, better implementation of public tasks. It is necessary to leave to public administration bodies a certain area of freedom to act on their own responsibility while performing the tasks entrusted. 15 Due to the principle of separation of functions, the court cannot replace the body; it cannot, in place of the decision left to the discretion of the body, make its own discretionary decision. 16 The Polish judicial control system is also based on such assumptions.
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Supreme Administrative Court and other administrative courts shall exercise, to the extent specified by statute, control over the performance of public administration.
The key elements of the Polish model of judicial review of public administration, in the scope important from the point of view of the analyzed problem, can be expressed in the following short theses:
Firstly, the function of the courts is to review the activity of the public administration, not to create or implement an administrative policy.
Secondly, judicial review covers only the legality of an administrative act, its compliance with legal rules that determine the work of the administration. The administrative court does not review opportunity. 17 Thirdly, since the court review the legality of the act, its role is not to make factual findings, but to check whether the authority correctly established the facts as the basis for the contested act. This results in the limitation of the scope of evidence proceedings conducted by the court. In the Polish model of judicial administrative review, evidence proceedings before a court are limited solely to additional documentary proof, if this is necessary to resolve substantial doubts and will not extend excessively the proceedings on the case (Article 106. 18 Dziennik Ustaw (Official Journal) 2018, item: 1302; in next: LPAC. 19 The court, granting the complaint against an administrative decision or order, shall: (1) set aside the decision or order in whole or in part, if it finds that there has been: a) a violation of substantive law, that have affected the outcome of the case, b) a violation of law which provides the basis to reopen administrative proceedings, c) other breach of procedural provisions, if it would have substantially affected the outcome of the case;
(2) find that the decision or order is invalid in whole or in part, if there exist grounds specified in Article 156 of the Code of Administrative Proceedings or in other provisions; (3) find the decision or order to be issued in violation of law, if there exist grounds specified in the Code of Administrative Proceedings or in other provisions.
ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019 99 findings, Polish administrative courts case law is of the opinion that the correctness of the process of determining the vague term by the administrative body is subject to full judicial review. This process falls within the sphere of conformity with the law as a criterion for judicial review. 20 In turn, the review of decisions based on administrative discretion is subject to certain limitations, resulting from the fact that the court can only review the legality of the act. For this reason, when controlling the acts based on administrative discretion, the court reviews the basis of competence (authorization of the authority to issue an act), the correctness of Particularly noticeable is the complex problem of delineating the limits of admissible interference by the court, resulting from the fact that the role of the court is to review the implementation of the administrative policy, not the independent implementation of this policy. Since the historical monument 20 ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019 101 can be expressed in the language of abstract legal norms. Moreover, these principles are, by their essence, very general, and so there would be a need to interpret them in the light of specific facts.
In relation to the review of acts in the field of historical monuments protection, the problems of the institutional capacity of courts to control the discretionary powers of the administration also emerge.
In cases where the object of judicial review is a decision based on specialist knowledge in the field of history, art and technology, the institutional capacity of the court significantly determines the rules specifying the rules for evidence-taking proceedings before a court. For obvious reasons, the court does not have such a level of expertise to independently review the assessments of the body, based on such knowledge. The effectiveness of judicial review therefore depends on the admissibility of the court to summon an external expert to obtain answers on issues related to the correctness of the assessments of a monument protection authority.
As I said, in the Polish model of judicial administrative review, evidence proceedings before a court are limited solely to additional documentary proof. The lack of the possibility to use the assistance of an independent external expert undoubtedly weakens the efficiency of judicial control of the activities of historical monument protection bodies based on arguments referring to specialist knowledge.
METHODOLOGY OF THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DISCRETIONARY
MARGIN OF HISTORICAL MONUMENTS PROTECTION BODIES IN THE CASE
LAW OF POLISH ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS
A WAY TO UNDERSTAND DISCRETION MARGIN
Proper court recognition of the type of discretion margin that the authorities of monument protection have at their disposal is crucial for the effectiveness of judicial review. The discretion margin is diverse, and the scope of the review and the "depth" of the court's interference in the content of the decision should be adapted to the kind of freedom (in particular, a significant distinction between administrative discretion and indefinite terms).
Analysis of the case law shows that the courts do not always see these differences and do not always correctly recognize the type of discretion margin that the legislators have granted to the authorities. One can also notice the lack of uniformity of views expressed in the case-law. In some situations, the responsibility for the lack of consistency of the courts in the analyzed area is on the legislature, which does not specify the conditions of the protection of historical monuments.
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According to the traditional view, administrative discretion refers to the choice of the consequences of the established facts, and the assignment of this form of discretion is confirmed by the modal phrases included in the regulation, such as "the body may". 24 However, legal practice creates a more complicated situation in which the sources of discretion margin can result simply from the lack of clearly defined criteria for issuing an act. An example is the basic form of historical monument protection, which is an entering into the register of monuments. In the content of the legal basis of this act (Article 9.1 of the APHM), it is in vain to look for the characteristic feature of administrative discretion, which is the modal expression that the decision to enter the historical monument into the register is not discretionary, are a different kind of discretion margin, based on the vague terms.
If the authority determines that the object has the features specified in the statutory definition of a historical monument, it is obliged to enter this object into the register of historical monuments. The specification of the reasons for making an entry into the register using vague terms ("a testimony to a past era or event, the preservation of which is in the interest of society due to its historical, artistic, scientific or academic value"), does not constitute grounds for accepting the thesis about the operation of an administrative body based on administrative discretion.
These terms are of an evaluative nature and therefore are subject to clarification in the process of applying the law. 25 The quoted argumentation of the courts indicates a reference to the classic views of the scholars of law, distinguishing the sphere of discretion margin, characterized by a different scope of freedom (the discretion margin resulting from the use of vague terms is different than that resulting from the classical administrative discretion). 24 Małgorzata Jaśkowska, supra note 5: 255. 25 However, opposing views can be noted, indicating that the decision to enter a historical monument in the register is discretionary.
In this case law, the courts observe that the provisions governing the entry of an object into the register of historical monuments do not introduce detailed criteria which the authority should follow in assessing the desirability of covering a monument with protection. The decision of the body is therefore discretionary and is based on the evaluation of a subject through the prism of the statutory definition of historical monument, the documentation collected and knowledge and experience of the voivodeship inspector for historical monuments and employees of the voivodeship office for historical monuments. 26 The above arguments can be considered justified in the absence of precise The proper understanding of the kind of discretion margin is not only a problem of theoretical correctness, but is of great practical importance. This becomes obvious if we look at the different attitudes of the courts to review different types of discretion.
While the review of the use of vague terms is more strict (additionally, it depends on the type of concept we are dealing with, as mentioned above), the courts show more self-restraint in terms of typical administrative discretion.
Therefore, incorrect determination of the type of discretion margin by the administrative court affects the incorrect narrowing of the scope of review. This, in consequence, may undermine the effectiveness of judicial review of the sovereign interference in the protection of historical monuments.
THE DUTY OF THE BODY TO COMPREHENSIVELY EXPLAIN THE
FACTS OF THE CASE
The issuance was preceded by properly conducted proceedings and an explanation of the facts of the case. The administrative court controls whether during the administrative procedure all necessary steps have been taken to clarify the factual situation, so that all evidence was gathered to determine whether there were any statutory grounds for issuing the decision. 27 As indicated in the case law, the body must clearly indicate not only historical, artistic or scientific values, but also the current technical condition of the object with an indication of the impact of this state on the preservation of these assets. As a consequence, the body's knowledge about the historic values of an object must be up to date. 28 However, the question arises of what this means in practice? How far does the court interfere with the decision of the body when it considers that the authority's findings as to the historical and scientific value of the object are insufficient? In these matters, some general theses can no longer be formulated. It all depends on the individual approach of the court to a particular case.
THE OBLIGATION TO CONSULT THE EXTERNAL EXPERTS WHEN
ASSESSING THE CONDITIONS OF INTERFERENCE
When analyzing in section 1.2 the basic issues related to the specificity of discretion margin in the sphere of historical monuments protection, I signaled the problem of whether the historical monuments protection authority can independently make the necessary factual findings in the field of interference conditions. For example: when evaluating if the object can be considered as a monument, can the body can do it independently or must it consult an expert who has appropriate specialist knowledge in the field of history, art, technology? In turn, in case of imposing obligations related to the execution of specific construction works on the monument, the question arises: can the body independently determine the scope of this work, or must it consult an expert with relevant expertise in the field of construction or art history (for example as regards the obligation to restore the previous state of the object)?
Generally, courts recognize that regulations do not impose on historical monuments protection bodies an obligation to consult experts before entering an object into the register of monuments. The historical monuments protection ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019 106 authorities with specialized personnel in this area are able to objectively assess, based on the collected evidence, whether the object has historical qualities or not. 29 As the courts emphasize, the monument protection bodies are specialized institutions that employ professional officials with specialist knowledge and experience in historical monuments protection. As a rule, the knowledge of officials should allow to determine the nature of a specific object. Authorities should have appropriate substantive competences in the cases examined, necessary even to assess whether the case should be examined by an expert. A specific object can be entered in the register of monuments without the need for a specialist opinion, if its historical character is obvious. It is not necessary that the authority ordered the In another judgment, it was pointed out that due to the scope of interference in the sphere of rights of citizens, the institution of entering the surroundings of the monument in the register should be used with great caution. In particular, it is necessary to comply with the basic directives of the administrative procedure and prohibit the use of an extensive interpretation. 33
The courts also place great emphasis on the proportionality of interference, which is particularly important in the case of acts based on discretionary powers.
For example, one of the judgments pointed out that the decision to establish a cultural park is left to the administrative discretion of the competent commune council. This does not mean, however, that the act can be issued in an unrestricted 33 Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw: 9 November 2015 (VII SA/Wa 220/15). It is an approach consonant with contemporary European standards in the field of review of administrative discretion, emphasizing the proper balance of conflicting interests. Arguments representing the balancing of these interests should be presented by the authority in of the grounds for the sovereign interference. 35
APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF A SPECIFIC
FORM OF INTERFERENCE
The far-reaching effects of using forms of historical monuments protection mentioned in the previous paragraph, in particular, the "depth" of interference in the sphere of property rights, explain the requirement of special care for the justification of the decision. Furthermore, due to limited competences to enter into the very substance of the decision, the courts place particular emphasis on the review of the justification for interference. The general thesis is that the authority is obliged to explain and present rational arguments related to the circumstances of the case, why it was necessary to use such and no other form of interference, and why the body in this particular way settled, in a specific case, the conflict of public and individual interests. ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019 110 discretionary power is required to collect and thoroughly examine the evidence, as well as comprehensive justification of its decision in terms of facts and law. 37
THE PROBLEM OF APPLYING APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARDS
IN CASES OF LESS FORMALIZED FORMS OF INTERFERENCE
The sources of discretion margin for historical monuments protection authorities may lie in the sphere of choosing less formalized activities. This choice may be motivated by the desire to avoid a more formal procedure by the authority, which can in extreme cases be assessed as an abuse of the procedure.
An example may be the situation in which the organ decides to enter the object into the voivodeship lists of monuments (commune inventory of monuments;
Article 22 of the APHM), instead of entering the object into the register of historical monuments. This first form is, to a much lesser extent, regulated by law, so it leaves the body for historical monuments protection more discretion margin. In addition, the scope of judicial review is limited in this case because the court, when reviewing the legality of an act, may appeal only to violation of the conditions laid down by law. For obvious reasons, the fewer conditions specified by law, the more difficult the role of the court reviewing the decision of the authority.
Entry of the object into voivodeship lists of historical monuments is not even treated by the legislature as a form of historical monuments protection -it is not mentioned in Article 7 of the APHM, which contains a catalog of these forms.
Nevertheless, this form of historical monuments protection is also associated with restrictions in the use of the monument being the object of protection, which is why the courts point to the need to retain some basic legal standards of interference in this case too. 38 The jurisprudence opposes the treatment of such forms as being exempt from ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019 111 lists of historical monuments, therefore the act will be subject to judicial review of legality.
As indicated in the case law, the authority which keeps the list of historical monuments (commune inventory of monuments) is not obliged to carry out administrative proceedings because it does not make any administrative decision.
The lack of provisions determining the course of proceedings results in the fact that the legality check boils down to the examination of the compliance of this action only with the provisions of administrative substantive law, excluding the provisions on administrative proceedings. 39 However, case law emphasizes that the lack of formalization of the rules of procedure does not mean that this activity can be performed without analyzing the reasons behind it, as well as documenting it even in a simplified form. Above all, the basic barrier to arbitrary decision-making by organs is the need to meet the basic objective prerequisite: even a less formalized form, which is an entry into the voivodeship list of monuments, can be used only in relation to an object meeting the statutory criteria of a historical monument. Therefore, the court checks whether the body correctly recognized that the object constitutes a historical monument within the meaning of the Act. As the courts point out, it is obvious that the inclusion of the monument's card into the voivodeship list of historical monuments must result from the authority's conclusion that the object is characterized by features that justify the inclusion of a special form of protection due to its historical, artistic or scientific value. Only such an object that meets the definition of a historical monument can be included into the list of historical monuments. 40
The lack of proper legal protection of the monument's owner in the case of using less formalized forms of protection of historical monuments raised doubts as to its compliance with constitutional and conventional standards for the protection ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 12, NUMBER 1 2019
CONCLUSIONS
In summary one can point out some basic theses that express the key elements of the methodology of examining the discretionary power of historical monument preservation authorities by Polish administrative courts.
First of all, administrative courts, when using terms that define different spheres of discretion margin, are not always fully in line with the views of scholarly opinion. In some judgments, erroneous definitions of discretionary power may be found. It is also possible to note judgments in which, in the court's opinion, the body's discretion margin results from the lack of precise determination of the prerequisites for action taken by the historical monuments protection authority.
Secondly, the courts put a special stress on the obligation of the body to comprehensively explain the facts of the case. The fulfillment of this obligation is a key criterion for assessing the correctness of the body's discretionary powers. In this respect, the courts recognize that the monument protection bodies have sufficiently competence to provide necessary findings requiring specialist knowledge in the field of history, art and technology, due to the specificity of the field and protected objects. The courts leave to the authorities the choice as to whether it is necessary to seek the assistance of external experts. Only in cases where the body's own knowledge is not sufficient for the proper fulfillment of the obligation of a comprehensive explanation of the facts of the case, the authority is obliged to seek external assistance in the form of an expert opinion as an entity with more extensive expertise.
Thirdly, the courts place great emphasis on the "culture of justification". An important object of review is justification of the form of the settlement. The body must fully explain, using suitably convincing arguments, that in the circumstances of the case, the body correctly exercised its discretion margin.
Fourthly, due to far-reaching interference in the sphere of rights of the historical monument's owner, the courts emphasize the need to make the act compliant with constitutional standards of interference in fundamental rights, in particular the principles of proportionality and protection of property. It is an approach in harmony with contemporary European standards in the field of control of administrative discretion.
Fifth, in the case of less formal activities, less determined by legal regulation, the courts points to the importance of complying with procedural standards and proper justification for undertaking the action. This approach is justified by the lack of adequately detailed legal rules determining the actions of the authorities, which may lead to arbitrariness. Considering significant property restrictions that even
